The Big Match is a multi-stage two-player game. In each stage Player 1 hides one or two pebbles in his hand, and his opponent has to guess that number; Player 1 loses a point if Player 2 is correct, and otherwise he wins a point. As soon as Player 1 hides one pebble, the players cannot change their choices in any future stage. Blackwell and Ferguson (1968) give an ε-optimal strategy for Player 1 that hides, in each stage, one pebble with a probability that depends on the entire past history. Any strategy that depends just on the clock or on a finite memory is worthless. The long-standing natural open problem has been whether every strategy that depends just on the clock and a finite memory is worthless. We prove that there is such a strategy that is ε-optimal. In fact, we show that just two states of memory are sufficient.
The Big Match is a multi-stage two-player game. In each stage Player 1 hides one or two pebbles in his hand, and his opponent has to guess that number; Player 1 loses a point if Player 2 is correct, and otherwise he wins a point. As soon as Player 1 hides one pebble, the players cannot change their choices in any future stage.
The Big Match was introduced by Gillette [2] and has been much studied, in part due to its arguably being the most basic game model that illustrates the difficulty of balancing the trade-off between short-and long-term strategic considerations.
In the Big Match, Player 2 can guarantee that Player 1 gets zero points on average, independently of the number of stages, by guessing odd or even with equal probability and independently in each stage. Executing such a strategy does not require that Player 2 know past history, the number of stages, or the stage number. However, the situation of Player 1 is completely different! Henceforth, unless otherwise mentioned, a strategy refers to a strategy of Player 1.
If Player 1 knows the number of stages, n, in advance, he can guarantee that he gets (at least) zero points on average. To guarantee this, he must hide one pebble with probability 1 k +1 when k stages remain. Thus, for example, in the last stage he hides one or two pebbles with equal probability, and in the first stage he hides one pebble with probability 1 n+1 . Executing such a strategy requires that Player 1 know the stage number and the number of stages, but it does not require that Player 1 know past history.
It follows from the above that if Player 1 does not know the number of stages n in advance, then he has no way of guaranteeing (at least) zero points (per stage) on average. This has led researchers to look for strategies that guarantee close to zero per stage on average in all sufficiently long Big Match games.
Any strategy in the Big Match has to decide on the stopping stage. A natural possibility is just to specify in advance the probability of each stage being the stopping stage. Such a strategy is called a Markov strategy. It has long been known, and it is easy to verify, that any Markov strategy in the Big Match is worthless; i.e., for any ε > 0 it does not guarantee more than −1 + ε points (per stage) on average in any sufficiently long Big Match game.
The principle of sunk cost seems to imply that optimizing from any point onwards should be independent of the past, and hence any optimization of the long-run average of the rewards can be achieved by a Markov strategy. Since any Markov strategy is worthless, one may erroneously conclude that any strategy is worthless.
However, this is not the case! Blackwell and Ferguson [1] introduced worthy (i.e., not worthless) strategies that prescribe the choice in each stage as a function of past history. Moreover, Blackwell and Ferguson introduced, for every ε > 0, a strategy that is ε-optimal; namely, it guarantees at least −ε points (per stage) on average in all sufficiently long games.
The question that arises is how much dependence on past history is needed for an ε-optimal strategy, or even a worthy one. This dependence is formalized using the following concept.
A memory-based strategy in the Big Match is a strategy in which the conditional probability of hiding one pebble depends on the current memory state and the clock (i.e, the stage number). The memory state is updated as a stochastic function of the current memory and of the guess of Player 2 in the previous stage, as well as of the clock.
The ε-optimal strategies introduced by Blackwell and Ferguson [1, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2] are memory-based, and the first of these is clock-independent; i.e., the hiding and memory updating do not depend on the clock. The memory state is simply the difference between the number of odd and even guesses; hence, up to stage n it takes integer values in the interval [−n, n].
The ε-optimal strategy by Hansen, Ibsen-Jensen, and Koucký [3] is memory-based and clockindependent. The memory state can be encoded so that, with high probability, up to stage n it takes integer values in [0, ln c n], for some constant c (and n > 3). On the other hand, all memory-based strategies that have a finite set of memory states and either are clock-independent (see, e.g., [4] ) or have a deterministic memory update function [3] are worthless in the Big Match.
It has been a long-standing natural open problem whether there exists a worthy memory-based strategy that has a finite set of memory states.
We answers this question positively. We show that, for every ε > 0, there is such a strategy that is ε-optimal. Moreover, it is a two-memory strategy; namely, it has a two-element memory set.
Our positive result applies to the infinite game as well. In the infinite game, the average win per stage need not be well defined, as the average number of wins over the first n stages need not converge. Nonetheless, our result is as strong as possible given that the strategy's ε-optimality in the infinite game is for the limit inferior.
